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Momkus McCluskey Attorneys Reverse $400,000 Verdict

Mark Monroe and Angelo Spyratos, members in Momkus McCluskey Monroe Marsh & Spyratos, LLC, successfully overturned a $400,000 jury verdict. In the case of Suzanne Phillips v. Phyllis Gannotti (Cook County), the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $400,000. In a recently released opinion, the First District Appellate Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on all issues.

In Phillips v. Gannotti, plaintiff had designated in its answers to Rule 213(g) opinion witness interrogatories that one of the witnesses to the accident, Charles Parcell, would opine that the plaintiff was traveling within the speed limit. It was not until the day of trial that it was discovered that Charles Parcell would in fact testify that the plaintiff was traveling approximately 5-10 mph over the speed limit. The trial court barred Charles Parcell from testifying as to his opinion that plaintiff was speeding at the time of the accident, despite the plaintiff's inaccurate representation as to what Mr. Parcell's testimony would be with regard to the plaintiff's speed. In its opinion, the First District Appellate Court reversed the barring of Charles Parcell's opinion, concluding that the trial judge's choice of the "drastic" sanction of barring Parcell's opinion testimony was an abuse of discretion.

Furthermore, as a result of the erroneous exclusion of Charles Parcell's opinion by the trial court, the trial court erred in directing a verdict on the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence. The trial court specifically ruled that there was no evidence of the plaintiff's excessive speed, despite the offer of proof made by Momkus McCluskey Monroe Marsh & Spyratos, LLC attorneys during the trial as to Charles Parcell's opinion that the plaintiff was speeding at the time of the accident. In a concurring opinion, Justice Wilson observed that there was circumstantial evidence, which resulted in jury questions as to the plaintiff's excessive speed and other negligence, and the trial court erred in directing a verdict for these reasons, in addition to barring the opinion testimony of Charles Parcell.

Finally, the appellate court remanded for a new trial on all issues. The appellate court rejected the plaintiff's position that a retrial on damages only would be improper, as the error in barring Charles Parcell's opinion testimony may have impacted on the issue of the plaintiff's credibility with regard to her testimony that she was not speeding at the time of the accident, and other errors committed by the trial court may have "infected" the award of damages.